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Abstract 
Virtually all U.S. states have now created voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) offering liability 
relief and other incentives for responsible parties to remediate contaminated sites. We use a duration 
model to analyze participation in Oregon’s program. In contrast to previous VCP research, we find that 
this program attracts sites with significant contamination, not just relatively clean ones. Furthermore, we 
find that regulatory pressure—in particular, the public listing of contaminated sites—drives participation. 
These findings imply Oregon has been able to spur voluntary remediation via public disclosure, a result 
that comports with key themes in the literature on voluntary environmental regulation. 
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What Drives Participation in State Voluntary Cleanup Programs? 
Evidence from Oregon 
Allen Blackman, Thomas P. Lyon, Kris Wernstedt, and Sarah Darley∗ 
1. Introduction 
More than a quarter century after the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA, or Superfund), hundreds of 
thousands of properties contaminated with hazardous substances have yet to be remediated 
(Simons 1998; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006). Part of the reason for this backlog is CERCLA 
itself, which by making liability for cleanup retroactive, strict, joint, and several, created 
incentives for property managers and developers to shun contaminated properties for fear of 
being saddled with the cost of cleanup. State “minisuperfund” laws with similar liability features 
may have compounded the problem. In addition, federal and state regulators typically have 
resources to oversee cleanup of only a relatively small number of severely contaminated sites 
(U.S. GAO 1997; Dana 2005).  
To address these concerns, since the late 1980s, virtually all states have created programs 
that offer a basket of incentives for responsible parties and others to voluntarily remediate 
contaminated sites.1 These incentives typically include relief from liability for future cleanup; 
variable (versus uniform) cleanup standards that link the level of required cleanup to the future 
use of the site; flexible enforcement of environmental regulations; expedited permitting; and 
financial support for remediation through mechanisms such as grants, loans, subsidies, and tax 
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incentives (U.S. EPA 2005). By 2004, roughly 20,000 contaminated sites had participated in, or 
were participating in, state voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) (U.S. EPA 2005). 
Despite the prominent role that state VCPs now play in contaminated site policy, we 
know relatively little about the factors that drive participation in these programs—information 
that is needed to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness. This gap in the empirical literature is 
partly due to the difficulty of collecting the necessary information. Econometric analysis of 
participation requires data on contaminated sites that are not participating in the VCP (a control 
group) as well as those that are (a treatment group). But data on nonparticipating sites are scarce 
because contaminated properties may be “mothballed” to avoid detection and because state 
regulatory agencies lack the resources to identify them.  
To our knowledge, only one econometric analysis of VCP participation has appeared. 
Alberini (2007) examines VCP participation in Colorado, which like most states does not 
maintain a database of contaminated properties that are not participating in cleanup programs. To 
construct a sample of nonparticipating sites, Alberini uses the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), a national 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registry of sites in need of investigation or cleanup. 
CERCLIS focuses on sites with relatively severe (confirmed or suspected) contamination that are 
candidates for the federal Superfund program. Alberini finds that Colorado’s VCP mainly 
attracts sites with minimal contamination and high development potential not listed in CERCLIS. 
She concludes that 
 
… these findings cast doubt on whether the VCP is truly attaining its original cleanup and 
environmental remediation goals and hints at the possibility that participation might be driven 
exclusively by the desire to rid the parcel of any stigma associated with the current or previous 
use of land (or to prevent such an effect with future buyers).  
 
The present paper analyzes VCP participation in Oregon, one of a small number of states 
that maintain databases of contaminated sites, including those with minimal contamination. We Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
 
3
use these data to construct a control sample.2 In contrast to Alberini’s findings for Colorado, we 
conclude that Oregon’s VCP does attract sites with significant contamination. Furthermore, we 
find that regulatory pressure—in particular, Oregon’s practice of formally compiling a public list 
of sites with confirmed contamination—drives VCP participation. Together, these findings imply 
that Oregon has been able to spur voluntary remediation by publicly disclosing information on 
contamination, a relatively inexpensive and hence efficient approach. Our results comport with 
key themes in the literature on voluntary environmental programs: the threat of mandatory 
regulation spurs participation in such programs, and public disclosure of environmental 
performance is an efficient policy tool for promoting abatement and remediation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the 
relevant literature. The third section provides background on Oregon’s VCP. The fourth section 
discusses our data and variables. The fifth section presents our econometric model, and the sixth 
section discusses our results. The final section offers conclusions. 
2. Literature 
A considerable literature has developed to explain participation in different types of 
voluntary environmental initiatives, including public programs administered by regulatory 
agencies, agreements negotiated between regulators and polluters, and unilateral private sector 
commitments.3 This section reviews the literature on participation in public programs and VCPs 
in particular. It also briefly discusses a second relevant literature, that on public disclosure 
initiatives. 
2.1 Public Programs 
Empirical research on voluntary environmental public programs suggests that pressures 
applied by regulators, markets, and civil society drive participation, as does variation in 
transaction costs associated with joining these programs. 
                                                 
2 We sought to identify a state that both operates a VCP with a sufficiently large number of sites and maintains a 
database of nonparticipating sites. Toward that end, we contacted regulatory authorities in 16 states (CA, CO, CT, 
IL, IN, KS, MA, MI, MO, NC, NC, NJ, OR, PA, TX, and WA) that have VCPs with more than 100 participating 
sites according to U.S. EPA (2005). 




A leading hypothesis in the literature on voluntary environmental regulation is that 
private parties participate in order to preempt more stringent mandatory regulation or to soften 
enforcement of existing regulation (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 
2000). Research on this “background threat” hypothesis as it relates to voluntary programs (as 
distinct from other types of voluntary regulation) has mostly focused on whether firms under 
pressure from regulatory authorities were more likely to join the EPA’s 33/50 program.4 Khanna 
and Damon (1999), Videras and Alberini (2000), Sam and Innes (2006), and Vidovic and 
Khanna (2007) all find that firms named as potentially responsible parties at a higher-than-
average number of Superfund sites were more likely to participate. Similarly, Videras and 
Alberini (2000) and Sam and Innes (2006) find that firms that were out of compliance with the 
Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act or the Clean Air Act were more likely to join. The 
evidence about the impact of regulatory pressure on 33/50 participation is not one-sided, 
however. For example, Arora and Cason (1996) and Gamper-Rabindran (2006) find that firms 
that violated Clean Air Act requirements were not more likely to participate. As for research on 
other public voluntary programs, Videras and Alberini (2000) show that firms named as 
potentially responsible parties at a higher-than-average number of Superfund sites were more 
likely to participate in EPA’s Waste Wi$e and Green Lights programs.  
Closely related to the hypothesis that regulatory pressure drives firms into voluntary 
programs is the notion that firms participate in order to obtain preferential treatment from 
regulators. For example, anecdotal evidence about Project XL, EPA’s flagship voluntary 
program during the 1990s, suggests that firms obtained significant production cost advantages 
from participation, chiefly through relief from certain environmental regulations (Marcus, 
Geffen, and Sexton 2002). Similarly, Cothran (1993) and Decker (2003) find that firms obtain 
permits for new facilities more quickly if they have engaged in voluntary abatement. 
2.1.2 Markets and civil society 
Pressure brought to bear by consumers may also motivate participation in public 
voluntary programs. Theory suggests that firms may voluntarily improve their environmental 
performance to attract “green” consumers (Arora and Gangopadhayay 1995). Some empirical 
                                                 
4 Launched in 1991, the 33/50 program required participants to pledge to cut their emissions of 17 high-priority 
toxic chemicals by 33% by 1992 and by 50% by 1995. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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evidence suggests that this logic applies to participation in voluntary programs. For example, 
Arora and Cason (1996) and Vidovic and Khanna (2007) show that firms with a higher ratio of 
advertising expenditures to sales were more likely to participate in EPA’s 33/50 program, and 
Videras and Alberini (2000) show that firms selling directly to final consumers were more likely 
to participate in the Waste Wi$e and Green Lights programs.  
Pressures generated by communities and nongovernmental organizations may also create 
incentives for firms to join voluntary programs. Such pressures are the focus of the literature on 
so-called informal regulation, which mostly consists of cross-sectional, plant-level econometric 
analyses of environmental performance in developing countries (see World Bank 1999 for a 
review). For example, Blackman and Bannister (1998) find that in the early 1990s, pressures 
applied by industry and neighborhood organizations spurred participation in a voluntary clean 
fuels initiative targeting small Mexican brick kilns. 
2.1.3 Transaction costs 
The transaction costs associated with joining voluntary regulatory programs inevitably 
vary across firms due to, among other things, difference in human capital, and may help explain 
participation (Delmas and Marcus 2004). For example, Blackman and Mazurek (2001) find that 
in a sample of 11 firms, transaction costs associated with participating in EPA’s Project XL 
averaged more than $450,000 per firm, varied considerably across firms, and appear to have 
deterred some firms from participating. 
2.2 Drivers of remediation 
Although to our knowledge Alberini (2007) is the only published econometric analysis of 
VCP participation, some authors using other methods have examined a closely related topic: site 
managers’ and developers’ incentives to remediate contaminated properties, whether via a VCP 
or not. Alberini et al. (2005) and Wernstedt, Meyer, and Alberini (2006) present results of 
conjoint choice experiments designed to identify the type of policies that create incentives for 
real estate developers to remediate contaminated properties. Alberini et al. (2005) find that 
European developers can be attracted to contaminated sites by subsidies, liability relief, and less 
stringent regulation. Wernstedt, Meyer, and Alberini (2006) find that U.S. developers place a 
relatively high value on liability relief—from both cleanup costs and claims by third parties—
and a relatively low value on reimbursement of environmental assessment costs.  
Researchers have also examined the impact of specific drivers of remediation, including 
financial incentives and the level of contamination. Sherman (2003) analyzes property tax Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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abatements, site assessment grants, development grants, and low-interest loans and concludes 
that of these financial incentives, property tax abatements are the most attractive to developers. 
However, he notes that financial incentives typically are not able to change developers’ decisions 
about whether to remediate a contaminated property. Schoenbaum (2002) examines a sample of 
contaminated and uncontaminated properties in inner-city Baltimore and fails to find a 
systematic relationship between contamination and the probability that a property was 
developed, suggesting that other factors, such as access to transportation and crime rates, play a 
more important role in developers’ decisionmaking. However, McGrath (2000) finds that sites in 
Chicago that may have been contaminated were less likely to be redeveloped. 
2.3 Public disclosure 
Public disclosure initiatives collect and disseminate data about private parties’ 
environmental performance both to inform the public about threats to human health and the 
environment and to strengthen private incentives for pollution control and remediation 
(Teitenberg 1998). Public disclosure has grown increasingly popular over the past 20 years, in 
part because it is viewed as a relatively inexpensive environmental management tool (Kerret and 
Gray 2007; Dasgupta, Wheeler, and Wang 2007). Although evidence about the U.S. Toxic 
Release Inventory, arguably the best-known public disclosure program, is mixed (Bui 2005; 
Greenstone 2003; Koehler and Spengler 2007), studies of other programs have generated 
compelling evidence that public disclosure can drive emissions reductions. These programs 
include so-called performance evaluations and ratings initiatives in Indonesia and India (García 
et al. 2007; Powers et al. 2008); 1996 amendments to the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act 
mandating that community drinking water systems publicly report regulatory violations (Bennear 
and Olmstead 2007); rules requiring U.S. electric utilities to publicly report the extent of their 
reliance on fossil fuels (Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack 2007); and British Columbia’s 
policy of publicizing the identity of plants that are noncompliant (Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante 
2002). Research suggests that public disclosure creates incentives for pollution control and 
remediation by leveraging many of the same pressures discussed in the literature on public 
voluntary programs, including those generated by regulators, markets, and civil society (Bennear 
and Olmstead 2007; Dasgupta et al. 2006). 
3. Oregon’s Cleanup Programs 
This section discusses the data that Oregon collects on contaminated properties and its 
mandatory and voluntary cleanup programs. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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3.1 The Environmental Cleanup Site Information database 
Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) maintains an Environmental 
Cleanup Site Information (ECSI) database, which in July 2006 contained information on 4,223 
contaminated, potentially contaminated, and formerly contaminated sites.
5 The sites in the 
database came to the attention of DEQ in a variety of ways, including corroborated citizen 
complaints and referrals from other regulatory programs, such as DEQ’s hazardous waste 
program and the federal CERCLIS. The criterion for inclusion in ECSI is simply that a site is 
known or suspected to be contaminated. ECSI contains a variety of data about sites including 
their location, former and present uses, ownership, and any remedial actions that have been 
performed. ECSI also contains information on all DEQ actions and decisions regarding each site.  
DEQ maintains two subsets of the database: the Confirmed Release List and the 
Inventory of Hazardous Substance Sites. The Confirmed Release List consists of sites where 
contamination has been confirmed (by qualified observation, operator admission, or laboratory 
data), has been deemed “significant” by virtue of its quantity or hazard, has not been regulated 
under another program, and has not been adequately cleaned up or officially deemed to require 
no further action. Managers of sites on the Confirmed Release List are subjected to enhanced 
pressures from both regulatory and nonregulatory actors. They can be required to participate in 
DEQ’s mandatory cleanup program and may have difficulty transacting their properties. Hence, 
“listing” is a serious regulatory action. Prior to listing, DEQ notifies site managers of its intent to 
do so and gives them an opportunity to comment and provide additional information. In addition, 
DEQ provides a public comment period prior to delisting a site that has completed the requisite 
cleanup. The Inventory of Hazardous Substance Sites is a subset of the Confirmed Release List. 
It comprises sites where contamination is considered a threat to human health or the environment 
and must be cleaned up. 
3.2 Oregon’s mandatory and voluntary cleanup programs 
DEQ classifies all contaminated sites as high, medium, or low priority for further 
regulatory action, and this classification determines each site’s eligibility for the state’s three 
cleanup programs: the Site Response Program, the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) and the 
                                                 
5 The number includes 377 “candidate” and “historical” sites that are not considered fully fledged entries. ECSI is 
not comprehensive; it does not include a significant number of sites about which DEQ has no information. ECSI 
also excludes sites with petroleum releases from underground storage tanks.  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Independent Cleanup Pathway (ICP). The Site Response Program is DEQ’s mandatory program, 
reserved for high-priority sites (although not all such sites are required to participate). For sites in 
this program, DEQ provides oversight throughout the investigation and cleanup and selects the 
remedial action. Of the 4,223 sites in ECSI, 10% are participating in, or have participated in, the 
Site Response Program. 
VCP and ICP are DEQ’s voluntary cleanup programs, targeted at medium- and low-
priority sites. However, high-priority sites are allowed to participate in VCP (but not ICP). ICP, 
and to a lesser extent VCP, entails lower levels of DEQ oversight than the mandatory Site 
Response Program. Of the 4,223 sites in ECSI, 27% have participated in, or are participating in, 
VCP and 7% have participated in, or are participating in, ICP. 
The mechanics of participation in VCP are as follows. Site managers submit an “intent to 
participate” form and deposit $5,000 in an account that DEQ may draw upon to cover 
administrative expenses. Next, DEQ reviews written documentation on the site, visits the site, 
and works with the site manager to develop a cleanup plan. DEQ holds a public comment period 
and then decides whether to approve, disapprove, or modify the cleanup plan. If the plan is 
approved, the site manager implements it. When implementation is complete, DEQ invites public 
comment again and, barring serious objections, issues either a “no further action” (NFA) 
determination, which provides some assurance that DEQ will not require further remediation, or 
a conditional NFA, which provides this assurance contingent upon the site manager’s 
undertaking certain actions, such as land-use control.  
DEQ promotional materials list a set of benefits and risks of participating in VCP 
(Oregon DEQ undated a). The benefits include DEQ guidance and oversight, possible 
exemptions from permits for on-site work, and DEQ permission to redevelop part of the site 
while cleanup is ongoing on other parts. Among the risks are automatically being added to ECSI 
and being forced to join the mandatory Site Response Program if the site falls behind in its 
implementation of the cleanup plan.  
ICP entails less DEQ oversight than VCP. Essentially, site managers who pass an initial 
screening are allowed to complete an investigation and cleanup independently and then request 
final approval from DEQ. That said, ICP participants can have DEQ oversight if they want it and 
are willing to pay for it. According to ICP promotional materials, the risks of participation 
include not winning DEQ approval of an independently planned and implemented cleanup. Also, 
DEQ does not provide permit waivers to ICP participants (Oregon DEQ undated b).  Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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DEQ recruits VCP and ICP participants by sending invitation letters to the managers of 
ECSI sites where DEQ has determined that further action is needed. The vast majority of such 
letters simply describe the programs. The remainder, which are sent to high-priority sites only, 
essentially give site managers an ultimatum: either join VCP or be forced to participate in the 
mandatory Site Response Program. Of the 1,318 sites in the ECSI database that are participating 
or have participated in VCP or ICP, 1,142 (87%) joined after being included in the ECSI 
database and receiving an invitation letter. The remaining sites were unknown to DEQ before 
they submitted an application to join. 
4. Analytical Framework, Data, and Variables 
This section describes the analytical framework, data, and variables we use to analyze 
participation in VCP and ICP. 
4.1 Analytical Framework 
We assume that a site manager will join VCP or ICP if the net benefits (benefits minus 
costs) of doing so are positive. The benefits include (i) the expected savings in transaction costs 
and cleanup costs that arise from avoiding the mandatory Site Response Program, under which 
the site manager would have less discretion in choosing how and how much to remediate, less 
regulatory flexibility (e.g., expedited and waived permits), and a higher level of DEQ oversight; 
(ii) the avoided future liability costs from obtaining an NFA; (iii) the expected appreciation in 
property value from remediation and obtaining an NFA over and above the savings in cleanup 
and liability costs; and (iv) the expected reduction in costs imposed by neighbors, community 
groups, environmental nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders concerned about 
contamination. The costs of participation include (i) pecuniary transaction costs, such as DEQ 
administrative fees; (ii) pecuniary and nonpecuniary transaction costs involved in learning about 
VCP and ICP and navigating the DEQ bureaucracy; (iii) costs of any actual cleanup; and (iv) for 
sites that are unknown to DEQ, the cost of informing DEQ about potential contamination, 
including costs associated with being added to ECSI. 
We expect those benefits and costs of participation to vary across sites, such that net 
benefits of participation are positive for some sites and negative for others. We do not directly 
observe benefits and costs. Using ECSI along with data from block-group census data, however, 
we can observe site characteristics that proxy for these costs. We use these proxies as 
explanatory variables in our regression analysis. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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4.2 Regression Samples 
We cannot run a single regression to explain participation in VCP and ICP because the 
subsample of nonparticipating sites is different for each program: as noted above, high-priority 
sites are eligible to participate in VCP but not ICP. Therefore, we constructed two samples of 
ECSI sites, one to explain participation in VCP, and one to explain participation in ICP.  
The first several steps of the database assembly were the same for both samples. First, we 
used geographic information system software to associate each ECSI site with a census block 
group and merged the site-level ECSI data with block-group census data. Of the 4,223 sites in 
ECSI, 458 had to be dropped either because locational information (latitude and longitude) was 
missing in the ECSI data or because block-group data were missing in the census data. Next, we 
dropped 340 sites that were ineligible to join VCP or ICP because they were participating in the 
mandatory Site Response Program (319 sites) or were listed on the federal National Priorities 
List (11 sites). We also dropped 120 ECSI sites that had received an “ultimatum” letter from 
DEQ warning them that if they did not join VCP, they would be forced to join the mandatory 
Site Response Program. We dropped these sites because their participation in VCP was not fully 
voluntary. In addition, we dropped four sites that DEQ had declared “orphans” because a 
responsible party could not be identified. Finally, we dropped 1,506 sites for which ECSI did not 
contain enough information to determine the prior industrial or other use of the site. The result 
was a data set containing 1,805 sites.  
To create the sample used to analyze VCP—which we will call the “VCP sample”—we 
dropped an additional 125 sites for which VCP join data were inconsistent (because join date 
preceded the date the site was entered into ECSI), leaving a total of 1,680 sites, 613 (36%) of 
which participated in VCP.  
To create the sample used to analyze ICP—the “ICP sample”—starting with the data set 
of 1,805 sites, we dropped 124 additional sites DEQ deemed to be high priority for further 
action, because such sites are not eligible to participate. In addition, we dropped 39 sites for 
which the ICP join date was inconsistent (again because join date preceded the date the site was 
entered into ECSI), leaving a total of 1,642 sites, 155 (9%) of which participated in ICP. 
4.3 Variables 
Table 1 lists the variables used in the econometric analysis and, for each sample, presents 
means for the entire sample and for the subsamples of participants and nonparticipants. We use 
four types of variables to explain participation in VCP and ICP: (i) dichotomous dummy Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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variables that have to do with DEQ regulatory activity; (ii) continuous variables that capture the 
characteristics of the neighborhood in which the site is located; (iii) variables that interact the 
regulatory activity and neighborhood characteristics variables; and (iv) dummy variables that 
control for the type of industrial or commercial activity found on each site. We are not able to 
include explanatory variables derived from the information in ECSI that ranks the severity of 
contamination (high, medium, low) because this information is missing or unreliable for the 
majority of the sample. 
4.3.1 Regulatory activity variables  
Among the regulatory activity variables, CRL is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
DEQ placed the site on the Confirmed Release List. As Table 1 shows, DEQ “listed” roughly a 
quarter of the sites in the VCP and ICP samples. We expect CRL to be positively correlated with 
participation because, as discussed above, listed sites are subjected to enhanced pressures to 
clean up from regulators and other actors, such as mortgage lenders. For example, listed sites 
face a higher probability of being forced into the mandatory Site Response Program and being 
denied bank credit. Thus, all other things equal, we expect the net benefits of participation to be 
higher for such sites. Table 1 provides a preliminary indication of a positive correlation between 
listing and participation in VCP. In the VCP sample, the percentage of sites that were listed was 
much higher among VCP participants (42%) than nonparticipants (16%). This seeming positive 
correlation between VCP and CRL does not prove that listing causes participation, however, 
because it may simply reflect an underlying correlation between CRL and another site 
characteristic. For example, it could reflect the fact that sites used for manufacturing (versus 
retail) tend to participate, and also tend to be listed. Alternatively, or in addition, the apparent 
correlation could reflect the effect of VCP on CRL—that is, perhaps sites that participate are 
subsequently listed. As discussed below, to control for site characteristics and potential 
endogeneity in CRL and other regulatory variables, we use a duration model that explicitly 
accounts for the timing of participation, listing, and other regulatory activities.  
CERCLIS is a dummy variable that indicates whether the federal government includes the 
site in CERCLIS, the database EPA uses to track activities conducted under its CERCLA 
authority. We expect that CERCLIS is positively correlated with participation in VCP and ICP 
because inclusion in this federal list, like inclusion in ECSI, presumably enhances regulatory and 
nonregulatory pressures to clean up and thereby increases the net benefit of participation.  
PERMIT is a dummy variable that indicates DEQ has issued a permit to the site manager, 
whether for air emissions, liquid effluents, or hazardous waste. About a sixth of the sites in our Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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two regression samples received permits from DEQ. We expect PERMIT to be positively 
correlated with participation for two reasons. First, all other things equal, DEQ likely has more 
comprehensive and more accurate information about potential contamination on permitted sites 
than on nonpermitted sites. As a result, one of the main costs to site managers of participation—
revealing information about potential contamination to DEQ—is lower for permitted sites. 
Second, by virtue of their ongoing contacts with DEQ, permitted sites likely have more accurate 
and more comprehensive information about VCP and ICP than do nonpermitted sites (Wistar 
2007). As a result, their costs of participation are lower.  
Finally, we include dummies that indicate which of the three DEQ regional offices (east, 
west, and northwest) is responsible for administering the site: W_REGION, and NW_REGION 
(the east region is the reference category). The west and northwest regions each have 
approximately 37% of the sites in our samples, and the east region has roughly 26%. These 
dummies aim to control for differences in program administration across the three regions that 
affect the net benefits of participation. We have no strong expectations about the signs of these 
dummies. 
4.3.2 Community characteristics variables 
We include two variables that measure potentially relevant characteristics of the 
communities in which the site is located. HOUSEVAL, the median housing value in the relevant 
census block group, aims to capture the market value of the site.6 To the extent HOUSEVAL is a 
good proxy for market value, we expect it to be positively correlated with participation for two 
reasons. First, site managers and developers may have stronger financial incentives to remediate 
more valuable properties. Second, contamination on particularly valuable sites may attract more 
attention from regulators, neighbors, and others.  
TR_TIME is the median travel time to work in minutes in the relevant census block 
group. It is included to control for locational factors that might influence a site manager’s 
decision to participate, including the market value of the site and proximity to companies that 
provide remediation services. We expect this variable to be negatively correlated with 
participation (as is distance to central business district in Alberini 2007) because sites located 
                                                 
6 We also collected data on commercial property values compiled at the county level for tax assessment purposes. 
However, we were unable to use these data in our regression analysis because most Oregon countries do not collect 
the data needed to locate the properties in the appropriate census block group or to control for property size. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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farther from business districts may be less valuable and may attract less attention from 
regulators, neighbors, and others. 
4.3.3 Interaction terms 
We include two interaction terms: CRL_HOUSEVAL, which is CRL interacted with 
HOUSEVAL, and CRL_TR_TIME, which is CRL interacted with TR_TIME. The aim of including 
these terms is to shed light on how listing affects the probability of participation. 
4.3.4 Prior use variables 
Finally, we include 14 dummy variables, SIC1–SIC14, that indicate the two-digit SIC 
code most closely associated with the site’s prior commercial or industrial use. These variables 
are intended to control for such site characteristics as size, complexity, and the nature of the 
contamination. In our regression samples, the categories with the greatest proportion of sites are 
SIC8 (transportation, communications, electricity, gas, and sanitary) with roughly 18%; SIC12 
(services, including dry-cleaning and auto repair) with roughly 17%; SIC10 (retail trade) with 
11%; and SIC4 (manufacture of wood products) with roughly 10%. Although ECSI contains 
more direct information on site characteristics, including the size and current operational status, 
these data are too incomplete to be used in our analysis. 
5. Econometric Model 
We use a duration model to analyze participation in VCP and ICP. Duration models are 
used to explain intertemporal phenomena, such as the length of time that patients with a life-
threatening disease survive, and the length of time industrial facilities operate before adopting a 
new technology.7 Duration models estimate a hazard rate, h, which may be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that a phenomenon occurs at time t given that it has not already occurred 
and given the characteristics of the unit of analysis (patient, plant) at time t. The hazard rate is 
defined as 
 
 h(t,  Xt, β) = f(t, Xt, β)/(1- F(t, Xt, β)) (1) 
                                                 
7 For an introduction, see Keifer (1988). Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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where F(t, Xt, β) is a cumulative distribution function that gives the probability that the 
phenomenon (death, adoption of a technology) has occurred prior to time t, f(t, Xt, β) is its 
density function, Xt is a vector of explanatory variables related to the characteristics of the unit 
of analysis (which may change over time), and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In our 
study, the hazard rate is the conditional probability that a site in our data set joins VCP or ICP at 
time t, given that it has not already joined and given the characteristics of the site at time t.  
In duration models, the hazard rate is typically broken down into two components. The 
first is a baseline hazard, h0(t), which is a function solely of time (not of any explanatory 
variables) and is assumed to be constant across all plants. The baseline hazard captures any 
effects not captured by explanatory variables (such as the diffusion of knowledge about VCP and 
ICP or changes in macroeconomic conditions). The second component of the hazard rate is a 
function of the explanatory variables. Combining these two components, the hazard rate h(t) is 
written 
 
  h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xt'β). (2) 
The vector of parameters, β, is estimated using maximum likelihood.  
A duration framework is appropriate for analyzing participation in the program for two 
reasons. First, two of the regulatory activity variables—CRL and CERCLIS—may be 
simultaneously determined along with VCP and ICP; that is, they are potentially endogenous. In 
theory, participation could result in a site’s being added to the Confirmed Release List or to 
CERCLIS. A duration model controls for this problem because it explicitly accounts for the 
intertemporal relationship of these explanatory variables and participation: once a site joins VCP 
or ICP, it drops out of the likelihood function, so the model takes into consideration only cases 
where listing precedes participation.8  
A second reason for using a duration model is that it avoids the problem of “right 
censoring” that would arise in a simple cross-sectional dichotomous choice model because some 
of the plants that were not participating in July 2006, when our ECSI data were collected, could 
join subsequently. A duration model circumvents this problem by estimating the conditional 
probability of participation in each period.  
                                                 
8 We are not able to account for the timing of PERMIT because the requisite data in ECSI are incomplete. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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We use a Cox (1975) proportional hazard model. There are two broad approaches to 
specifying duration models. One is to make parametric assumptions about the time dependence 
of the probability density function, f(t, Xt, β). Common assumptions include exponential, 
Weibull, and log-logistic distributions. Each assumption implies a different shape for the 
baseline hazard function, h0(t).9 A second general approach is to use a Cox (1975) proportional 
hazard model that does not require a parametric assumption about the density function. This 
feature accounts for the broad popularity of the Cox model among economists, and it is the 
reason we choose it. We use days as our temporal unit of analysis. 
6. Results 
Table 2 presents regression results for the Cox proportional hazard model. Model 1 and 
Model 2 focus on participation in VCP, and Model 3 focuses on participation in ICP. Because 
the hazard function given by equation (2) is nonlinear, the estimated coefficients do not have a 
simple interpretation (technically, they are the effect on the log hazard rate of a unit change in 
the explanatory variable at time t). Exponentiated coefficients, however, can be interpreted as the 
hazard ratio—that is, the ratio of the hazard rate given an increase in an explanatory variable at 
time t (a unit increase in a continuous variable or a change from 0 to 1 of a dichotomous dummy 
variable) relative to the baseline hazard rate at time t. A hazard ratio greater than 1 indicates that 
an increase in the explanatory variable increases the hazard rate relative to the baseline. For 
example, a hazard ratio of 2 means that an increase in the explanatory variable doubles the 
hazard rate relative to the baseline. 
6.1 Voluntary Cleanup Program 
Of the regulatory variables in Model 1, CRL, PERMIT, and NW_REGION are significant 
at the 5% level. As expected, both CRL and PERMIT are positively correlated with participation. 
The hazard ratios for these variables indicate that all other things equal, a site that has been 
placed on the Confirmed Release List is 28% more likely to join VCP than a site that has not 
been listed, and a site that has been permitted is 30% more likely to join VCP than a site that has 
not been permitted. The regression results also indicate that the DEQ administrative region 
                                                 
9 For example, an exponential probability density function generates a flat hazard function, h0(t). The implication is 
that the probability of joining VCP and ICP (apart from the influences of regulatory activity and site characteristics) 
stays the same over time. A log-logistic probability density function, on the other hand, generates a hazard function 
that rises and then falls. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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where the site is located affects the probability of participation: sites administered by the 
northwest DEQ region are 34% more likely to join than sites in the east region (the reference 
group). Evidently, listing a site in CERCLIS has no impact on the probability of participation.  
Of the community characteristic variables, TR_TIME is significant at the 10% level. 
However, the magnitude of the effect is quite small. Surprisingly, HOUSEVAL is not significant. 
Of the prior use variables, all are significant at the 5% or 10% level. The largest effects are for 
SIC4 and SIC13.  
Model 2 interacts CRL with HOUSEVAL and TR_TIME to try to better identify the 
effect of CRL. Here, CRL is no longer significant, but results for the remaining variables in 
Model 1 are qualitatively identical. The interaction term CRL_HOUSEVAL is significant at the 
5% level, but CRL_TR_TIME is not significant. These results suggest that listing has a 
significant impact when the market value of the site is relatively high. Alternatively, they suggest 
that the market value of the site has an impact when the site is listed. 
6.2 Independent Cleanup Pathway 
Of the regulatory variables in Model 2, only W_REGION and NW_REGION, the two 
dummies that indicate which DEQ region administers the site, are significant, both at the 1% 
level. The hazard ratios indicate that sites in the west region are 3.24 times more likely to 
participate in ICP than sites in the east region, and sites in the northwest region are 2.57 times 
more likely to participate. Neither of the two community characteristics variables is significant. 
Finally, four of the prior use dummy variables are significant, all at the 5% level. The largest 
effects are for SIC7 and SIC9. 
6.3 Discussion 
Several of the results from the empirical analysis are particularly noteworthy. First, both 
of Oregon’s voluntary cleanup programs are attracting sites with significant contamination. This 
is evident from the simple summary statistics in Table 1 which indicate that 42% of the 613 sites 
in our sample that participated in VCP and 25% of the 155 sites that participated in ICP were 
included by DEQ on the Confirmed Release List (recall that sites are listed if contamination has 
been confirmed and deemed significant by virtue of its quantity or hazard). This finding contrasts 
sharply with the situation in Colorado, where according to Alberini (2007) the state voluntary 
cleanup program almost exclusively attracts sites with minimal contamination and high 
development potential. Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Second, Models 1 and 2 imply that sites on the Confirmed Release List with relatively 
high market values are more likely to join VCP, all other things equal. The result for CRL in 
Model 1 indicates that for the average site, inclusion in the Confirmed Release List increases the 
probability of participation by 28%, all other things equal. The results for CRL and 
CRL_HOUSEVAL in Model 2 suggest that inclusion on the Confirmed Release List mainly 
affects the probability of participation for sites with relatively high market values. Two 
complementary explanations for these findings are possible. One is that listing enhances 
regulatory and nonregulatory pressures for remediation, and these pressures are strongest in areas 
where property values are relatively high. For example, community groups in high-property-
value areas may place more pressure to remediate on listed sites than do community groups in 
areas with low property values. The other is that managers of high-value listed sites may have 
stronger financial incentives to remediate than managers of low-value listed sites. For example, 
listing may not affect the manager’s decision to transact the site when the market value is low; in 
such cases, the manager may have no intention of selling or developing the site. However, for 
valuable sites, listing may derail sales or development plans and may create incentives to join 
VCP to obtain an NFA letter.  
Those two findings—that the Oregon VCP is attracting sites with significant 
contamination and that listed sites are more likely to join—are potentially important from a 
policy perspective. Together, they imply that DEQ has been able to spur voluntary remediation 
of some contaminated sites by adding them to the Confirmed Release List. 
A third finding is that listing does not drive participation in ICP. The reason may be that 
ICP, by virtue of the criteria and rules for participation, selects for sites where contamination is 
less severe and where remediation is relatively straightforward. Presumably, regulatory and 
nonregulatory pressures for remediating such sites are relatively low. If DEQ faces resources 
constraints that force it to focus on the most heavily contaminated sites, then managers of lightly 
contaminated sites know that their chances of being drafted into the mandatory Site Response 
Program are relatively low. Moreover, even if this does happen, mandatory cleanup is probably 
relatively inexpensive. Also, sites of the type that participate in ICP probably face relatively little 
pressure from nonregulatory actors.  
A final noteworthy result is that sites with DEQ permits are more likely to participate in 
VCP. We hypothesized that sites that were permitted would be more likely to join, partly 
because they face lower costs of doing so since DEQ is more likely to already know about the 
potential contamination, and also because the managers are more likely to already be familiar 
with DEQ and its VCP. Without follow on research, we cannot be sure that this explanation is Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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valid. However, it also hints at the potential importance of informational issues in explaining 
VCP participation. 
7. Conclusion 
We have presented an econometric analysis of participation in a state voluntary cleanup 
program. We have overcome the problem of assembling a control group of nonparticipating sites 
by focusing on VCPs in a state that maintains a registry of known contaminated sites. The 
regressors in our econometric analysis are site characteristics that aim to capture the benefits and 
costs of participation, including the expected savings that arise from avoiding the mandatory Site 
Response Program, and the cost of revealing to DEQ that a site is contaminated. We have used a 
duration model to account for the intertemporal relationship between our explanatory variables 
and participation, and to avoid right censoring.  
Our results suggest that (i) Oregon’s voluntary cleanup programs are attracting sites with 
significant contamination, and (ii) all other things equal, sites that state regulators have formally 
added to a public list of sites with confirmed significant contamination are more likely to 
subsequently join one of the state’s voluntary programs. Together, these findings imply that state 
regulators can spur voluntary remediation of contaminated sites by collecting, verifying, and 
publicly disclosing information on contamination. This is a mechanism for encouraging VCP 
participation that, to our knowledge, has not yet received any attention in literature. Compared 
with some other policy tools frequently used to encourage participation in VCPs, it would appear 
to be relatively inexpensive. Our findings comport with a growing body of evidence suggesting 
that public disclosure of environmental performance is an efficient policy tool for promoting 
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Tables 
Table 1. Variables in econometric analysis: Definition and sample means 
Variable  Description  VCP Sample  ICP Sample 












DEPENDENT          
VCP  Participant in Voluntary Cleanup  Program?*  0.365 1  0  0.398 0.477 0.389 
ICP  Participant in Independent Cleanup  Pathway?*  0.107 0.109 0.105 0.094 1  0 
INDEPENDENT          
Regulatory activity          
CRL  On Confirmed Release List?*  0.255 0.423 0.159 0.242 0.245 0.242 
CERCLIS In  CERCLIS?*  0.168 0.119 0.197 0.155 0.084 0.162 
PERMIT  Has DEQ permit?*  0.168 0.194 0.150 0.151 0.110 0.155 
E_REGION   In DEQ eastern region?*  0.263 0.321 0.229 0.257 0.181 0.265 
W_REGION  In DEQ western region?*  0.371 0.238 0.448 0.378 0.361 0.380 
NW_REGION  In DEQ northwestern region?*  0.366 0.440 0.323 0.365 0.458 0.355 
Neighborhood characteristics          
HOUSEVAL  Median house value in census block group ($)  142,237.1  145,068.4  140,610.5 142,564.6 158,785.8 140,873.7 
TR_TIME  Med. travel time to work in census block group (min.)  12890.9  13,120.9 12,758.8 13042.9  14,051.8 12,937.7 
Prior use          
SIC1  SIC div. A: agriculture, forestry, farming*  0.044  0.024 0.056 0.045 0.032 0.046 
SIC2  SIC div. B: mining*  0.060 0.021 0.082 0.055 0.026 0.058 
SIC3  SIC div. C: construction*  0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 
SIC4  SIC div. D, major group 24: manufacturing: wood 
products except furniture* 
0.102 0.124 0.089 0.098 0.103 0.097 
SIC5  SIC div. D, major group 28: manufacturing: chemicals   0.027  0.016 0.034 0.027 0.026 0  .027 
SIC6  SIC div. D, major groups 33, 34: primary metals except 
machinery and transportation* 
0.039 0.046 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.034 
SIC7  SIC div. D, other major groups: manufacturing: all other 
products* 
0.076 0.078 0.074 0.072 0.077 0.071 
SIC8  SIC div. E: transport, comm. electric, gas, and sanitary*  0.176 0.206 0.159 0.186 0.155 0.189 
SIC9  SIC div. F: wholesale trade (includes bulk oil and 
salvage)* 
0.100 0.124 0.086 0.094 0.110 0.093 
SIC10  SIC div. G: retail trade*  0.107 0.093 0.115 0.110 0.097 0.111 
SIC11  SIC div. H: finance, insurance,  and  real  estate* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SIC12  SIC div. I: services (includes dry-cleaning, auto repair)*  0.174 0.171 0.175 0.173 0.265 0.163 
SIC13  SIC div. J: public administration (includes  military)*  0.043 0.051 0.039 0.046 0.045 0.046 
SIC14 Not  classifiable*  0.049 0.044 0.052 0.056 0.026 0.059 
*Dichotomous dummy variables (0/1)Resources for the Future  Blackman et al. 
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Table 2. Duration regression results 
 
Variable Model  1 
Dep. var. = VCP 
Model 2 
Dep. var. = VCP 
Model 3 
Dep. var. = ICP 












































Interaction terms     
CRL_HOUSEVAL  n/a 1.000** 
(0.0000012) 
n/a 
CRL_TR_TIME  n/a 1.000 
(0.0000075) 
n/a 



































































Number of observations  1,680  1,680  1,642 
Log pseudolikelihood   -3687.138  -3685.5098  -771.856 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
* significant at 10% level  
** significant at 5% level  
*** significant at 1% level 